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Abstract
This paper investigates what drives countries to legislate presumed consent —making citizens
organ donors by default unless they opt out— instead of explicit consent. Results reveal the following:
First, civil law predicts presumed consent, which uncovers a mechanism by which an institution that
long pre-dates transplantation medicine has an impact on current health outcomes. This is in line
with previous research that has found that civil law regimes tend to be more comfortable with a
centralized and activist government than common law ones. Second, Catholicism predicts presumed
consent. This is consistent with previous research that shows Catholicism generally relies on more
hierarchical structures and is less likely to encourage social responsibility among its members. Last,
higher pro-social behavior decreases the likelihood of presumed consent. This could be explained by
policy-makers trying not to discourage donations where pro-social behavior is high by making it look
a requirement rather than an altruistic act. The implications of the findings are discussed, with a
particular focus on policy-switches in organ donations.
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1 Introduction
Across the World Health Organization member states, an estimated 126,670 organs were transplanted in
2015 (Global Observatory on Donation and Transplantation, 2015). This figure pales in comparison to
the number of patients with end-stage organ failure: within the US alone, nearly 120,000 patients are on
the transplantation waitlist, and an estimated 20 people die each day while waiting for a transplant (US
Department of Health and Human Services, 2018). Despite progress in transplantation medicine, there
remains a worldwide shortage of organs available.
In the face of a global shortage, countries vary widely in their rates of deceased organ donation
(IRODAT, 2017). Cross-country analyses suggest that this may be influenced by the type of legislation
implemented —whether a country presumes consent (such that residents are organ donors by default
unless they ‘opt out’), or requires explicit consent (where residents actively ‘opt in’ for organ donation)
(Johnson and Goldstein, 2003; Abadie and Gay, 2006; Gimbel et al., 2003; Shepherd et al., 2014). Ex-
perimental research suggests that the default influences individual decision-makers by communicating a
recommendation or by normalizing organ donation (Davidai et al., 2015; Mckenzie et al., 2006). Corre-
spondingly, several countries have reported increases in the donor pool after presumed consent laws were
passed (Shum and Chern, 2006; Rithalia et al., 2009).
While a causal link has not been established definitively, a systematic review of the literature concluded
that “[i]n the four best quality between-country comparisons, presumed consent law or practice was
associated with increased organ donation—increases of 25-30%, 21-26%, 2.7 more donors per million
population, and 6.14 more donors per million population in the four studies” (Rithalia et al., 2009).
Comparing similar countries that differ in their organ donation policies, Davidai et al. (2015) show that
donation rates are six time greater in countries with presumed consent than in countries where donation
requires explicit consent. Taken together, the extant literature suggests that the introduction of presumed
consent would result in an increase of donation rates (Ugur, 2015; Li et al., 2013; Oz et al., 2003) and
ultimately better health outcomes: “as impressive as 130,000 [annual] solid organ transplants worldwide
may be, it is estimated that this number represents less than 10% of the global need” (WHO, 2020).1
Although the potential implications of policy types are sizable, to the best of our knowledge, there has
been no study that uses data from all continents to explore in a systematic manner what drives countries
to choose presumed over explicit consent. This is what this paper does: by identifying mechanisms that
have led countries to establish opt-out laws, this paper aims to inform future debates on the suitability
of such laws in different contexts.2
1Other than presumed/explicit consent policies, there are other mechanisms that affect organ donation rates: among
them, health system capacity is probably the most important. For instance, according to IRODaT, in countries like Spain,
the USA, or Thailand, utilized deceased donors represent 100% of actual deceased donors. In other countries, however,
this percentage may drop significantly. For instance, in Australia (93.3%), Brazil (85.2%), or Moldova (54.5%), not all
organs eventually reach a patient (see Watson and Dark (2012) for more details on technical advancements and challenges
in transplantation). Other legal tools such as allocation priority to donors have been shown to also affect donation rates (Li
et al., 2013; Zúñiga-Fajuri, 2010). See Bagheri (2005), Bendorf et al. (2013), or Callison and Levin (2016) for a discussion
of other factors that explain different donation rates across countries.
2While (Shepherd et al., 2014), (Abadie and Gay, 2006) and (Healy, 2005) suggest a few patterns, their studies do not
aim to systematically uncover the determinants of presumed consent, and have significantly smaller sample sets for analysis
(48, 22, and 17 countries, respectively) than ours (93 countries).
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Our data set includes all countries present in the International Registry on Organ Donation and
Transplantation dataset (IRODaT – Gómez et al. (2014)). This leaves us with 93 countries from all five
continents, which we categorize as explicit consent (if they require individuals to opt in as donors; N = 48),
presumed consent (if consent is assumed, unless indicated otherwise; N = 39), and unclear/mixed policy
(no legislation in this matter, no organs procurement from the deceased, no national organ networks, or
unclear policy; N = 6). We focus on those variables that the previous literature has considered to be
relevant with regards to decisions about deceased organ donations (Abadie and Gay, 2006; Rithalia et
al., 2009; Shepherd et al., 2014): religion and system of beliefs; public preferences for redistribution and
for a public health system; economic and technological capacity to carry out transplants; legal traditions;
and altruism. Hence, we collect data on economic development, social equality, health outcomes, state
religiosity, religion preferences, legal system, urbanization, human development, political preferences, and
altruism.
Results reveal a few key predictors. First, countries with civil law regimes are more likely to pass
presumed consent laws. Second, compared to Protestant countries, Catholic countries are considerably
more likely to hold presumed consent laws — we find no significant effects for other religious faiths.
Third, most of our results suggest that countries with a larger religious population (including believers
of any faith) do not have presumed consent policies. Fourth, presumed consent is less likely in countries
with higher pro-social behavior. Taken together, these results suggest that the legislator is to some extent
(but not fully) responsive to the preferences of the public.3
2 Data and empirical specification
Countries are selected if they are in the International Registry on Organ Donation and Transplantation
dataset (IRODAT – Gómez et al. (2014)). This leaves us with 93 countries, which we categorize as
follows: explicit consent (countries that require individuals to opt in as donors; N = 48), presumed
consent (countries where consent is assumed, unless indicated otherwise; N = 39), and unclear/mixed
policy (countries that do not have legislation in this matter, do not procure organs from the deceased, do
not have national organ networks, or cannot be identified clearly as having either explicit or presumed
consent; N = 6). Table 1 and Table 2 in the supplementary materials provide the list of countries, their
current legislation status and the sources used, whereas Figure 1 in the supplementary materials shows
a world map with the main variables of interest: donation laws, legal origins, and religious faith.
For each country, we collect information on main religion, state religiosity and % of religions population
to capture the dominant credo and system of beliefs regarding the dead and their bodies — in particular,
predominant religion of each country is determined as the largest religious community according to
CIA (2018). Size of public sector, size of public health system and maximum tax rates are used to
proxy political preferences, in particular preferences for redistribution and for a public health system.
3While much has been written on individual preferences for organ donations (see, for instance, Park et al. (2009),
Wakefield et al. (2010), Salim et al. (2010), Bratton et al. (2011), or Miller et al. (2019)), we are not aware of any study
that looks at predictors of support specifically for organ donation laws. We encourage future research to shed light on this
issue.
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GDP per capita, degree of urbanization, life expectancy, literacy rate, formal education levels, and
OECD membership capture economic development and technological capacity. Mortality rate for ages
5-14 and physicians per thousand people capture health outcomes and capacity of the health system.
Legal system captures the preferences and modus operandi of the legislator. Democracy index, Gini
index and percentage of members of parliament who are women capture the level of equality and social
development. Blood donations per capita and giving index score measure altruism. Lastly, religious and
ethnic fragmentation proxy for social cohesion. Table 3 in the supplementary materials gives further
details on the sources of all independent variables, whereas Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics and
further details.
To find the key predictors of presumed consent, we adopt a machine learning based approach to sort
through all the possible partial correlations between predictors and organ donation consent laws. We
use the Lasso regression approach and an exhaustive search model (all details in sections 2.1 and 2.2 of
the supplementary materials). Results are remarkably consistent across the different approaches we use:
legal origins is the only variable that is always included. Main religion, and variables regarding health
outcomes (children mortality rate), political preferences (public sector size) and political development
(democracy index) are typically selected, too. When included, religious fractionalization and altruism
tend to be a key predictor of organ donation laws as well —since data on ethnic fractionalization, religious
fractionalization, and proxies for altruism exist only for a subset of countries, we do not include them in
the main analysis.
In order to show the relative importance of each variable, and the direction of the correlation, we run
the following linear model using the variables most frequently selected by the machine learning algorithms:
Policyi = α +X ′iβ + εi, (1)
Policyi is a dummy that captures presumed consent (1=presumed consent; 0=explicit consent), i denotes
country, and X denotes the vector of independent variables. The variables included in X are legal
origins, mortality rate (ages 5-14), dominant religion,4 state religiosity, % who are religious, log of GDP
per capita, size of the public sector, democracy index, degree of urbanization, and OECD membership.
The supplementary materials show that results hold when we include all remaining ones in a series of
robustness checks.
3 Results
Table 1 confirms that the strongest predictors of presumed consent are legal origins and religion. Civil law
countries are more likely than common law countries to have an opt-out system. The magnitude of the
observed effect is large: caeteris paribus, civil law countries are five times more likely to pass presumed
4We classify them into ‘Catholic’, ‘Christian Orthodox’, ‘Protestant’, ‘Islam’, and ‘Other’. We acknowledge that classify-
ing religious affiliation into five categories inevitably simplifies the analysis. Our categories follow the convention of similar
cross-country studies in epidemiology (e.g. WHO (2006)) and economics (e.g. the seminal work on religion and attitudes
by (Guiso et al., 2003)).
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consent laws than common law countries.5
Table 1: Drivers of presumed consent legislation
Dependent Variable: Presumed consent (opt-out)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Civil Law 0.269* 0.278* 0.319** 0.330**
(0.146) (0.155) (0.155) (0.156)
Mortality (5–14 year old) -0.074** -0.078 -0.068 -0.064
(0.033) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056)
Main religion:
Catholic 0.224 0.318* 0.399** 0.446**
(0.160) (0.167) (0.171) (0.173)
Orthodox 0.151 0.267 0.311 0.359
(0.199) (0.248) (0.246) (0.244)
Islam 0.095 0.267 0.382 0.462*
(0.183) (0.252) (0.256) (0.256)
State religion 0.168 0.268* 0.270*
(0.148) (0.156) (0.155)
% religious -0.007* -0.008**
(0.004) (0.004)
Public sector size 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log (GDP) p.c. -0.088 -0.072 -0.059
(0.096) (0.095) (0.093)
Democracy index 0.115 0.128 0.151*
(0.085) (0.084) (0.083)
Urbanization -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 87 87 87 85
R2 0.225 0.290 0.319 0.350
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Dependent Variable: 1=Presumed consent (“opt-out”); 0=Explicit consent (“opt-in”). Civil Law: legal system
based on civil law only (base category: common law or neither. Unreported category: both civil law and common
law). State religion: dummy variable for holding an official, government-endorsed religion. Main religion: base
category=‘Other Christian’; unreported category=‘Other’. Not shown: OECD membership (dummy). See Table
3 and Table 4 in the supplementary materials for more details on the variables.
The influence of a country’s predominant religion does not pale in comparison. Namely, countries
where Catholicism dominates are around four times more likely to enact presumed consent than countries
where Protestantism dominates. We find no significant results for other religions when we compare them
to Catholicism. Column (4) excludes Australia and Germany, since both countries have virtually the
same number of Protestants and Catholics according to official statistics.6 Excluding both does not alter
our results: When we include them, the resulting p-values for Catholicism are 0.043, 0.024, 0.020, and
0.039 (for all four possible combinations). The impact of health outcomes (proxied by child mortality)
is on the other hand, less clear. Whereas results suggest that countries with lower child mortality rates
are more likely to have presumed consent, this effect vanishes once we control for political and social
5In fact, out of the 25 countries with common law in our dataset, only four have implemented presumed consent. Out
of this four, two have a “pure” common law system (Singapore and Bahrain), whereas the other two have a mixed common
law/civil law system (Malta and Norway).
6Whereas the CIA World Factbook specifies that there are 0.7% more Protestants than Catholics in Australia, the
Australian Bureau of Statistics recently stated that “Catholicism is the largest Christian grouping in Australia” albeit by
a small margin (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2017), and the US Freedom Report on Australia does not provide a clear
answer on the largest denomination in the country (US Department of State, 2016)).
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development outcomes.
Apart from legal origins and religious faith, we find that countries with a larger proportion of reli-
gious population —regardless of faith— tend to prefer explicit consent systems. Everything else held
constant, a country where half its residents hold any religious faith will implement presumed consent
with a probability close to 80%, whereas that probability drops to around one third for a country where
everyone is religious. However, as discussed below, this result is not robust to all specifications. Table
9 in the supplementary materials replicates Table 1 with the inclusion of countries where the policy is
not clear (i.e., where the dependent variable is 1 for presumed consent and 0 for explicit consent/no
policy/unclear/mixed). All results hold.
3.1 Robustness checks and alternative explanatory variables
Figure 3 in the supplementary materials shows that results for civil law, Catholicism, and altruism are
robust to the inclusion of all remaining controls described above. However, results regarding proportion
of religious population reveal that, whereas clearly suggestive, we cannot make statements as conclusive
as with the case of the other three explanatory variables.
Using data from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and Dražanová (2019), we also assess whether
ethnic and religious fragmentation can predict presumed consent (as mentioned above, since data on these
dimensions exists only for a subset of countries, we do not include them in the main analysis). Results
are unambiguous: countries with higher religious fragmentation are less likely to have presumed consent.
This suggests that policy-makers might be more reluctant to impose organ donations where societies are
less homogeneous. All details can be found in sections 2.1 and 2.2 of the supplementary materials.
Finally, Figure 4 in the supplementary materials shows that —with only the exception of altruism— no
other variables have explanatory power at conventional statistical levels: when we include measures that
capture pro-social behavior, we find that lower levels of altruistic behavior are associated with opt-out
consent systems — see Figure 1) below (as with religious fractionalization, we test altruism separately
because of data constraints). We proxy altruism with ‘giving index’, a measure constructed by the
Charities Aid Foundation by means of a worldwide survey (Charities Aid Foundation, 2017). Specifically,
it is computed based on the proportion of people who report one or more of the following non-health
related altruistic behavior in the month prior to being interviewed: helping a stranger, donating money,
and volunteering. We find that countries in which residents report higher levels of giving are more likely
to enact explicit consent. To be precise, the predicted probability of having opt-out for a country with a
giving score of 25% is around three times larger than for a country with a score of 50%.
4 Discussion and remarks
We find that the historical origin of a country’s laws is the strongest predictor of organ transplant policies:
countries with civil law regimes are more likely to enact presumed consent policies, whereas common law
countries are more likely to prefer explicit consent rules.
6
Figure 1: 95% confidence intervals. Bars with an empty diamond: no controls added. Bars with a
solid square: full set of controls. Model: Policyi=α + X
′
iβ + γzi+ εi, where z is the relevant variable,
Policyi is a dummy for presumed consent, Xi is a vector of country specific controls: mortality rate
among those aged 5–14 year old, state religion, main religion, percent who are religious, legal origins,
GDP per capita, democracy index, and OECD membership. N = 79.
Historically, the common law tradition originates from the laws of England, whereas the civil law
tradition has its roots in the Roman law, and was adopted and exported by France. These two legal
systems operate in very different ways: civil law relies on professional judges, legal codes, and written
records; whereas common law focuses on lay judges, broader legal principles, and oral arguments (Glaeser
and Shleifer, 2002). Furthermore, common law follows the legal principle of stare decisis, — i.e., precedent
is binding— while this is not necessarily the case for civil law (Dainow, 1996). Since legal traditions were
typically introduced into colonized countries through conquest, persisted after independence, and varied
between common and civil law colonizers, they provide a natural experiment for researchers to trace the
effects of legal system variation on various outcomes (Anderson, 2018).
Among other findings, civil law regimes are more likely to impose military conscription (Mulligan and
Shleifer, 2005), to have government ownership of media (Djankov et al., 2003) and banks La Porta et al.
(2002), to strictly regulate labor markets (Botero et al., 2004), to favor a heavier hand of government
ownership and more hierarchical regulation (La Porta et al., 2008; D’Amico and Williamson, 2015), and
to be more comfortable with a centralized and activist government than common law regimes (Mahoney,
2001). Adding to this literature, our findings suggest that donation laws also tend to reflect the polity’s
default position on broader conceptions of the relationship between the individual and the state (Healy,
2005). Notably, by highlighting how the more interventionist approach of civil law countries extends to
the area of organ donation laws, our results underscore how legal origins have consequences that extend
into the sphere of health: previous research has suggested that better health outcomes in countries
with civil law legal origin seem to result from greater decentralization of government funds, higher rates
of urbanization, and less ethnic fractionalization (Scanlon, 2016). Results in this paper add a fourth
mechanism: presumed consent. While it has been claimed that ‘default saves lives’ in organ donation
7
(Johnson and Goldstein, 2003), the evidence suggests that a country’s legal origins is what dictates its
default in the first place. This complements recent work highlighting the impact of legal origins on the
HIV rates of females in Sub-Saharan Africa (Anderson, 2018).
Our finding has also relevant implications for Legal Origins Theory: critics have argued that legal
origins are “merely a proxy” for political, historical or social developments that occurred as the legislation
was being developed (La Porta et al., 2008; Spamann, 2015). In clear contrast to this, organ donation
laws did not appear until well into the second half of the 20th century —organ transplants were not
feasible in a safe and systematic way until the 1970s.7 That is, many decades after the establishment of
the legal system. While it is plausible that a lurking unobserved confounder explains both legal origins
and contemporary policies, it is likely that the major channel by which legal origins may have affected
organ donation laws is via the modus operandi inherent to each type of legal system — i.e., a preference
for “private market allocations vs. a preference for state-based allocations” (La Porta et al., 2008). In this
sense, organ donation laws are a perfect case in point to illustrate that countries design laws consistently
with their legal traditions, which is in essence the core of Legal Origins Theory.
In this respect, future research should shed light on whether legal origins have a similar predictive
power on other contemporary policies. For instance, with regards to the current Covid-19 pandemic,
results in this paper and the previous literature suggest that civil law and common law countries would
respond in a different fashion. Whereas civil law countries could be expected to implement centralised
policies with very specific regulations on what citizens may or may not do, common law countries would,
in principle, be expected to respond in a more de-centralized, less regulatory-driven fashion.
The second key predictor of donor legislation is religion. Catholic countries are nearly 30 percentage
points more likely to legislate presumed consent than Protestant-dominant countries. Notably, this is not
driven by religious credo, since formally all religions endorse deceased organ donation (Bruzzone, 2008). In
particular, Protestant and Catholic leaders express equal levels of support to deceased donations (Oliver
et al., 2010). We thus contend that our observed findings reflect the institutional and social dynamics
induced by these two different religious affiliations.
In previous research, Protestantism has been associated with higher levels of altruism (Mocan and
Tekin, 2007; Bekkers and Schuyt, 2008). It has been shown to encourage lay members to engage in
voluntary activities both inside and outside the church (Lam, 2006; Arruñada, 2010), to encourage the
pursuit of social responsibility among its members (relative to other religions) (Lam, 2002), and to rely on
more horizontal structures than Catholicism (Rose, 1954; Lipset, 1990).8 On the other hand, Catholicism
has been characterised by more hierarchical structures and a greater reliance on the government to
take responsibility, favoring the provision of social services within its own hierarchy and limiting lay
involvement. In particular, lower levels of volunteering have been found among Catholics as compared to
Protestants (Lam, 2002). Although religious leaders in Catholic and Protestant countries have no direct
say on legislation, historically dominant religions are likely to leave a long-lasting imprint on cultures
7“There was simply no need for such laws.” (Howard et al. (2012), p. 9). See (https://www.organdonor.gov/about/
facts-terms/history.html) for details.
8See (Kahl, 2005) for a discussion on religious roots of altruistic attitudes
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and may shape people’s attitudes — even if they are not religious themselves (Halman and Luijkx, 2006;
Kaasa, 2013). That is to say, religions may have affected the legislator’s policy choices through the
political culture they contribute to shape. In this light, the state having limited say regarding organs
from the deceased seems to fit within the general lack of hierarchization intrinsic to Protestantism, leaving
more room for individual altruism to dictate organ donation decisions.
Beyond the Protestant-Catholic distinction, countries with a larger religious population (including
believers of any faith) are less likely to hold opt-out policies. Although formally no major religion opposes
donations (Bruzzone, 2008), research has shown that religiosity is negatively associated with willingness
to donate organs (Ugur, 2015; Wakefield et al., 2010; Rumsey et al., 2003; Wong, 2010; van Dalen and
Henkens, 2014). These two results suggest policy-makers are responsive to citizens’ demands to some
extent. If religious individuals have a stronger hesitation to donate and this translates into lobbying
against presumed consent, such political pressure is more likely to be successful in countries where the
presence of religious groups (of any kind) is more widespread. Nonetheless, we caution that — unlike
dominant religion — the proportion of religious adherents is not robust across all model specifications.
Further, the measure of religiosity that we use (from the CIA World Factbook) is not as precisely estimated
as other variables in our data set (details in the supplementary materials). Thus, we are circumspect
regarding the association between the proportion of a religious population and organ donation laws.
Finally, our results suggest that presumed consent systems are associated with lower levels of non-
health related philanthropy and lower levels of pro-social behaviour. This confirms the findings in Shep-
herd et al. (2014). Although this result may seem surprising, experimental research suggests that opt-in
policies portray donation as an active, altruistic act (Davidai et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2019). This por-
trayal aligns with the norm of giving as an active process that exists in countries where philanthropy is
high (Shepherd et al., 2014). Conversely, opt-out policies depict donation as a mundane form of commu-
nity service, akin to paying one’s tax (Davidai et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2019). In turn, this representation
may encourage donation in countries where altruism is lower. In other words, if policy-makers rationally
respond to citizens’ preferences and social norms, they should enact presumed consent where altruism is
lower, and require explicit consent where pro-social behavior is higher. Our data is consistent with this
hypothesis.
In a period when many countries are re-visiting their organ donation laws (only in 2018, Argentina, the
Netherlands and Ukraine have updated them), our findings have relevant policy implications. However
central the role of legal origins may be, the salience of the religious and social values dimensions highlight
the importance of recognizing that adoption of presumed consent does not occur in a vacuum. In many
recent commentaries, leading policy makers and researchers have been advocating for a presumed consent
policy in a blanket manner —as if it were the panacea for the worldwide organ shortage. However, findings
in this paper and previous research emphasize the need for parallel measures in order to guarantee the
success of opt-out systems (Bilgel, 2012; Domı́nguez and Rojas, 2013; Li et al., 2013; Shepherd et al.,
2014; Zúñiga-Fajuri, 2010). Similarly, several countries have debated this possibility in the public space,
but concluded that cultural factors rendered an opt-out policy impractical (Etheredge et al., 2018). This
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highlights that governments would do wisely to anticipate more resistance in contexts that may not be
as friendly.
As La Porta et al. (2008) note, states may apply the tools characteristic of their legal style to areas
of regulation where they are inappropriate. Presumed consent laws are likely to be a good example if
the legislator fails to register public preferences that are opposed to such procedures. For instance, if the
legislator in a common law country aims to implement presumed consent, it is likely to face resistance
from different actors (e.g., civil society or the bureaucracy). In that case, it would be wise to learn
from Norway or Malta, countries that have a mixed common law/civil law system and have successfully
implemented presumed consent.9 More generally, by highlighting the characteristics most frequently
associated to organ donation laws, this paper provides a checklist of possible resistance factors for policy-
makers who may try to implement presumed consent. Overall, the implication is clear: when calls are
made for governments to switch to presumed consent, discussions should move beyond behavioral science
research to consider the broader socio-cultural context.
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